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1. INTRODUCTION
There are large theoretical and experimental literatures on ambiguity aversion,
starting with Knight [1921], Keynes [1921], and the famous thought experiment of
Ellsberg [1961], which suggests that decision makers prefer lotteries with known
distributions to lotteries with unknown distributions. Ellsberg’s thought experi-
ment led to the development of models of decision making under ambiguity that
generalize expected utility models (henceforth, EU); see Gilboa [2009]. Numerous
laboratory studies confirmed Ellsberg’s conjecture and found evidence of ambigu-
ity aversion; see, for example, Camerer and Karjalainen [1994]; Fox and Tversky
[1995]; Salo and Weber [1995]; and Halevy [2007]. Despite these large literatures,
very little is known about the empirical importance of ambiguity in real world mar-
kets.
In this paper we contribute to the literature on ambiguity aversion by showing
how to identify and estimate the effect of ambiguity aversion in a real-world first-
price auction market where bidders are symmetric and have independent private
values. Bidding behavior in a first-price auction depends on the bidders’ beliefs
about the distribution of valuations. The empirical literature on first-price auctions
generally assumes that bidders know the true valuation distribution. However,
bidders may face ambiguity about the valuation distribution, especially if they have
limited information. Therefore, any empirical strategy that ignores ambiguity and
resulting policy recommendations will no longer be valid.
Determining the effect of ambiguity aversion on bidding is important for pol-
icy recommendations. Under ambiguity aversion the revenue equivalence princi-
ple fails [Lo, 1998]. However, whether ambiguity aversion leads to more or less
aggressive bidding than an ambiguity-neutral bidder in first-price auctions is the-
oretically not determined [Bodoh-Creed, 2012] and therefore is an empirical ques-
tion. Furthermore, under ambiguity aversion the first-price auction is generally not
optimal, and the optimal reserve price depends on ambiguity aversion; see Bose,
Ozdenoren, and Pape [2006]; Bose and Renou [2014]; and Bodoh-Creed [2012].
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To model ambiguity we rely on the maxmin expected utility model (henceforth,
MEU), which was axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989]. They show that
if the preferences satisfy certain axioms, the decision maker behaves as if she is
maximizing her minimum expected utility, where the minimum is taken over a
unique and convex set of priors Γ.1 To use MEU in a strategic setting we assume
that Γ is common knowledge among bidders, which is analogous to the common
prior assumption of Harsanyi [1967].
In our context Γ is a set of valuation distributions, and the bidding strategy is
determined by the lower envelope of Γ. Therefore, the bid distribution depends on
the true valuation distribution and the lower envelope of Γ. As we cannot identify
two unknown distributions from a single bid distribution, additional restrictions
are necessary for point identification. We impose the exclusion restriction that nei-
ther Γ nor the true distribution of valuations depends on the number of bidders.2
We show that the true valuation distribution and the lower envelope of Γ are point-
identified under this assumption, by exploiting variation in the number of bidders.3
We extend the identification result to allow for constant relative risk aversion and
for unobserved auction heterogeneity.4 An extension to risk aversion is important
because it can have a similar effect on bidding as ambiguity aversion. Allowing
for unobserved auction heterogeneity is important because in most applications,
the researcher cannot observe all relevant characteristics. We allow the unobserved
auction heterogeneity to be correlated with the number of bidders, which means
that bidders can select into auctions based on unobservable auction characteristics.
1 There are models of decision under ambiguity that distinguish between the decision maker’s
attitude toward ambiguity and ambiguity. The MEU model, however, does not make such distinc-
tion; see Machina and Siniscalchi [2014]. Therefore, we use both terms interchangeably throughout
the paper.
2 Examples of papers using this restriction include Haile, Hong, and Shum [2006]; Guerre, Per-
rigne, and Vuong [2009]; and Aradillas-Lopez, Gandhi, and Quint [2013]. We discuss the assumption
in more detail in section 2.
3 The set Γ cannot be identified because the bid function depends only on the lower envelope of
Γ. As the bid function depends only on the lower envelope of Γ, the MEU first-price auction model is
similar to a model with a single prior distribution, which is allowed to differ from the true valuation
distribution and takes the role of the lower envelope in the MEU model. We discuss the similarities
and differences between both models in in Appendix A-3.
4 See, for example, [Athey and Levin, 2001] and [Krasnokutskaya, 2011].
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For estimation we propose a direct Bayesian method based on Bernstein poly-
nomials. Bayesian methods were introduced in the empirical auction literature by
Bajari [1997] and have subsequently been used by Sareen [1999, 2003]; Li and Zheng
[2009, 2012]; Kumbhakar, Parmeter, and Tsionas [2012]; Aryal and Kim [2013]; Kim
[2013]; and Kim [2015]. To model the lower envelope, we introduce a quantile-
quantile function (henceforth, the D−function) that maps the true valuation dis-
tribution to the lower envelope of Γ. We then specify the valuation density and
the D−function using Bernstein polynomials, and use the Bayesian decision rule
to choose the reserve price.
We evaluate the performance of our estimation method in a series of Monte Carlo
exercises. Initially, we consider two cases. In the first case the bid data are gener-
ated from a model with ambiguity, and in the second case without ambiguity. In
both cases, the method precisely estimates the D−function, the true valuation dis-
tribution, and the CRRA parameter. It also chooses reserve prices that generate
nearly maximal revenue. We then consider an additional scenario in which the
bidders face ambiguity but the econometrician incorrectly uses the EU model. The
effect of ambiguity on bidding is partly (and incorrectly) captured by the CRRA
parameter, leading to overestimation of the CRRA coefficient. Even though this
overestimation moves the reserve price in the right direction, model misspecifica-
tion still results in a revenue loss.5,6
In our empirical application we study the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions be-
tween 1976 and 1978 that are set aside for small firms (most of whom were loggers)
in the Pacific Northwest. We choose this time period because after the National
Forest Management Act of 1976, the Forest Service switched from ascending auc-
tions to first-price auctions as the main selling method in this region. As less than
2% of the sales before the end of 1976 were first-price auctions, the period after the
5 Unlike risk aversion, ambiguity aversion can lead to more or to less aggressive bidding. Risk
aversion can only capture some of the effects of ambiguity aversion on bidding, and thereby move
the reserve price in the right direction, if ambiguity aversion leads to more aggressive bidding.
6 Monte Carlo experiments comparing our method with an indirect frequentist estimation
method can be found in Aryal, Grundl, Kim, and Zhu [2017].
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policy change provides a suitable environment to study ambiguity. We find evi-
dence of ambiguity among bidders – the posterior probability of the EU model is
less than 5%. Our estimates imply that the seller has no incentive to eliminate am-
biguity among the bidders because it leads to aggressive bidding. We also conduct
counterfactuals where we “shut down” ambiguity and risk aversion to isolate their
effects on the bids and the seller’s revenue.
We also estimate the model using data from California, which borders the Pacific
Northwest. However, unlike in the Pacific Northwest, in California the first-price
auction was common before 1976. We find that the effect of ambiguity on bidding
is very small in California.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. We discuss the model and
identification in section 2, the estimation methodology in section 3, the Monte Carlo
study in section 4, and the empirical application in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. MODEL AND IDENTIFICATION
An indivisible object is allocated to one of n ≥ 2 bidders in a first-price auction
without a binding reserve price. Each bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} observes her own value
vi and the number of bidders n, and then bids bi. The values v1, . . . , vn are indepen-
dent and identically distributed draws from F0(·|n), with density f0(·|n), which is
strictly positive on the support [v(n), v(n)]. Bidders, however, do not know F0(·|n).
To model their bidding behavior, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Bidders’ preferences have the MEU representation.
MEU was axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], and it generalizes the EU
paradigm. If preferences have the MEU representation, then bidders have a set of
priors Γn, rather than a single prior. We make the following assumptions about Γn.
Assumption 2. (1) F0(·|n) ∈ Γn.
(2) The prior set Γn is common knowledge among the bidders.
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The first part of this assumption ensures that the bidders do not rule out the true
valuation distribution. The second part of this assumption allows us to use the
MEU model in a strategic environment, in the spirit of Harsanyi [1967].
The bidders maximize their expected utility under the most pessimistic scenario
that is consistent with Γn. Let βn(·) be the equilibrium bid function. If all (n− 1)
opponents use βn(·), then a risk-neutral bidder with valuation v solves
max
y∈R+
inf
F∈Γn
{
[v− βn(y)] F(y|n)n−1
}
= max
y∈R+
{
[v− βn(y)] F∗(y|n)n−1
}
where F∗(v|n) is the lower envelope of Γn, i.e., F∗(v|n) := infF∈Γn F(v|n). Notice
that the equilibrium bidding strategy only depends on F∗(·|n). To guarantee that
F∗(·|n) is well behaved, we impose the following regularity conditions on Γn.
Assumption 3. (1) Every F ∈ Γn has a density f with a bounded interval support.
(2) There exist strictly positive and bounded constants C1, C2 such that ∀F ∈ Γn,
C1 ≤ f ≤ C2 on its support.
(3) Any two distributions in Γn are mutually absolutely continuous.
The first two parts of this assumption are mild restrictions. The third part guar-
antees that all distributions in Γn have the same support.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1–3, F∗(·|n) is a distribution function with density f ∗(·|n).
In addition, C1 ≤ f ∗(·|n) ≤ C2 on its support [v(n), v(n)].
This lemma shows that F∗(·|n) has a density bounded away from 0 on its sup-
port. Moreover, it extends the common support property to f ∗(·|n), i.e., f ∗(·|n) has
the same support as the distributions in Γn, including f0(·|n).
This lemma allows us to establish existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in symmetric monotone strategies following Maskin and Riley [1984],
Lebrun [1996], and Athey [2001], because F∗(·|n) plays the same role under MEU as
F0(·|n) under EU. The bidding strategy is characterized by the following first-order
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condition:7
β′n(v) = (v− βn(v))(n− 1)
f ∗(v|n)
F∗(v|n) , v ∈ (v(n), v(n)] , (1)
with the boundary condition βn(v(n)) = v(n). It is worth noting that ambiguity
aversion can lead to more aggressive or to less aggressive bidding compared to the
case without ambiguity aversion.8
We now turn to identification. The econometrician observes bids. Let G(·|n) be
the distribution of bids with density g(·|n). Define D : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that
D(γ) := F∗
[
F−10 (γ|n)
∣∣∣n] , γ ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
Thus the D- function maps F0(·|n) to F∗(·|n). If D(γ) < γ for some γ ∈ (0, 1), then
there is ambiguity. D is used in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 1. F0(·|n) and F∗(·|n) are not identified.
The proof is in the Appendix A-1. This result is not surprising, as we cannot hope
to recover two distributions from a single bid distribution. In view of this noniden-
tification result, we consider the following restriction:
Assumption 4. (Exclusion Restriction) For all n, Γn = Γ and F0(·|n) = F0(·).
This assumption holds if bidders participate randomly in auctions. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, it also holds in the affiliated signal entry model of Ye [2007] and Gentry
and Li [2014] if the researcher can condition on all the variables that are observed
7 The first-order condition is only a necessary condition, but it can be established that if all (n− 1)
rival bidders use βn(·), then it is also optimal for the remaining bidder with value v to bid βn(v). See,
for example, Krishna [2010], Proposition 2.2.
8 Consider the following example adapted from Bodoh-Creed [2012]. Let F0 be the uniform
distribution on [0, 1] and n = 2. Then, the equilibrium bidding strategy without ambiguity aver-
sion is β(v|F0) = v/2. Now consider a set Γ1, which contains F0, with the lower envelope
F∗1 (v) = (v + v2)/2 on [0, 1]. The bidding strategy is β(v|Γ1) = (3v + 2v2)/(6 + 6v), which is
greater than β(v|F0). Next, consider a different set Γ2, which contains F0 with the lower envelope
F∗2 (v) =
{
v− v2/3, v ∈ [0, 0.6]
7/4v− 17/6v2 + 25/12v3, v ∈ [0.6, 1] , which has a continuous density function. The
bidding strategy for those with value v ≤ 0.6 is β(v|Γ2) = (9v− 4v2)/(18− 6v) < β(v|F0).
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by the bidders, including the number of potential bidders N.9 Under the entry
model by Levin and Smith [1994], which is a polar case of the affiliated signal entry
model, the exclusion restriction holds even without conditioning on the number of
potential bidders. It is, however, crucial that the bidders observe n before bidding.
This assumption allows us to use variation in n for identification after conditioning
on N.10
If there is unobserved auction heterogeneity, we cannot condition on all the vari-
ables that are observed by the potential bidders. In section 2.2 we address this issue
by generalizing the model to allow for unobserved auction heterogeneity that can
be correlated with the number of bidders. This generalization allows bidders to
enter auctions based on the unobserved auction heterogeneity.11
Under Assumptions 1–4, two first-order conditions from auctions with different
numbers of bidders define a system of two functional equations involving F0 and
F∗. If this system has a unique solution, then F0 and F∗ are nonparametrically
identified. We provide a constructive argument to show that the system indeed has
a unique solution and that F0 and F∗ are therefore identified.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1–4, F0 and F∗ are identified.
9 In the affiliated signal entry model, bidders receive a signal si about their valuation, but signals
and values are i.i.d. across N ≥ 2 potential bidders. In a symmetric equilibrium of the entry-game,
with constant entry cost c > 0 among N potential bidders, bidders enter if their signal is above
some (endogenously determined) threshold value s(N, c). Suppose n ≤ N bidders enter the auc-
tion, then the valuation distribution among these n bidders (F0) is simply the valuation distribution
for potential bidders (F0), conditional on their signal being above the entry threshold s(N, c), i.e.,
F0 (·|N, n) = F0 (·|N, si ≥ s(N, c)). If N varies exogenously across auctions, it is important to condi-
tion on it, because otherwise the valuation distribution will vary with n and violate Assumption 4.
In general, without additional variation, we can only identify F0 (·|N, si ≥ s(N, c)). But an exception
is the entry model of Levin and Smith [1994], where the signal is not informative about the value and
therefore we identify F0(·|n) = F0(·|N). If there is exogenous variation in entry cost, one can identify
F0(·|N, s) following Gentry and Li [2014].
10 If n is not observed by the bidders and the value distribution and prior set do not change with
N, we can still identify the primitives in some circumstances. For example, under the entry model
of Levin and Smith [1994], the primitives can still be point-identified. Under the entry model of
Samuelson [1985], the primitives are only partially identified. In the interest of space, we do not
include details here. We thank an anonymous referee for this observation.
11 Our results also extend readily to the case of an excludable instrument that affects the partici-
pation decision but not the valuation distribution; see, for example, Haile, Hong, and Shum [2006].
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Proof. First, we use the monotonicity of the bid function to write G(βn(v)|n) =
F0(v) and differentiate both sides with respect to v to obtain β′n(v) = f0(v|n)/g(βn(v)|n).
We can then rewrite the first-order condition as follows:
(v− βn(v)) f
∗(v)
F∗(v)
F0 (v)
f0 (v)
=
G (βn(v)|n)
g (βn(v)|n) (n− 1) , v ∈ (v, v] . (3)
The adjustment term f
∗(v)
F∗(v)
F0(v)
f0(v)
on the left-hand side is equal to one only if there
is no ambiguity. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that this ratio does
not vary with n, but the term on the right-hand side changes with n. In particular,
evaluating the first-order condition at n = n1 and n = n2 and taking the ratio at the
same v allows us to identify the value v as
v =
βn2(v)G(βn1(v)|n1) (n2 − 1) g (βn2(v)|n2)− βn1(v)G(βn2(v)|n2) (n1 − 1) g (βn1(v)|n1)
G(βn1(v)|n1) (n2 − 1) g (βn2(v)|n2)− G(βn2(v)|n2) (n1 − 1) g (βn1(v)|n1)
.
Bids corresponding to the same value v, and hence the same quantile, can be cou-
pled through G (βn1(v)|n1) = F0(v) = G (βn2(v)|n2). Then we can identify the
inverse bid function in the n1 bidder auction, for b ∈ [βn1 (v) , βn1 (v)] as
β−1n1 (b) =
b2(b) (n2 − 1) g (b2(b)|n2)− b (n1 − 1) g (b|n1)
(n2 − 1) g (b2(b)|n2)− (n1 − 1) g (b|n1) , (4)
where b2(b) := G−1 (G (b|n1) |n2). As the inverse bid function is identified, F0 and
f0 are identified. Using the fact that F∗ (v) = 1, we can then integrate up the first-
order condition to identify F∗ (v) = exp
(
− ∫ vv f0(t)(t−βn1 (t))g(βn1 (t))(n1−1)dt
)
.12 
2.1. Constant Relative Risk Aversion. In this subsection we extend our model to
allow for constant relative risk aversion. Risk aversion can have similar effects on
bidding as ambiguity aversion. However, unlike ambiguity aversion, risk aversion
always leads to more aggressive bidding. Bajari and Hortac¸su [2005] and Lu and
Perrigne [2008] find that the CRRA specification fits the data well.
Assumption 5. The utility function is CRRA, i.e., u(w) = w
1−θu
1−θu , θu ∈ [0, 1).
12 In Appendix A-2 we present the identification results when we relax the common support, i.e.,
the mutual absolute continuity, assumption, and allow f0 and f ∗ to have different supports.
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Then, if all (n− 1) opponents use βn(·), then a risk-averse bidder with valuation
v solves
max
y∈R+
inf
F∈Γn
{
u(v− βn(y))F(y|n)n−1
}
= max
y∈R+
{
(v− βn(y))1−θu
1− θu F
∗(y|n)n−1
}
.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–5, [F0(·), F∗(·), θu] are identified.
2.2. Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity. This section provides identification re-
sults with one-dimensional unobserved auction heterogeneity. Unobserved hetero-
geneity is problematic because the inverse bid function (4) becomes invalid unless
we can condition on the unobserved heterogeneity, which is not observed by def-
inition. Moreover, as we rely on the variation in n for identification, unobserved
auction heterogeneity is particularly problematic if it is correlated with n.
Let τ be the unobserved auction heterogeneity with distribution Fτ (·|n) and den-
sity fτ (·|n). If τ is discrete, fτ (·|n) is a probability mass function.13 The conditional
distribution of values given (τ, n) is F0 (·|τ, n), with density f0 (·|τ, n). The prior
set is Γ(τ, n). Its lower envelope F∗ (·|τ, n) has a density f ∗ (·|τ, n). Both f0 (·|τ, n)
and f ∗ (·|τ, n) are strictly positive on the common support [v (τ, n) , v (τ, n)], where
v (τ, n) and v (τ, n) are continuous in τ.
Our objective is to identify θu, F0 (·|τ, n), F∗ (·|τ, n), and Fτ (·|n) from the joint
bid densities in auctions with different n. To this end, we first adapt Assumption 4
to allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
Assumption 6. F0 (·|τ, n) = F0 (·|τ) and Γ (τ, n) = Γ (τ) for n = n1, n2.
To allow for nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity, we follow Hu, McAdams,
and Shum [2013] and assume that τ shifts F∗(·|τ, n) up in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD).
Assumption 7. If τ1 > τ2, then F∗ (v|τ1, n) ≤ F∗ (v|τ2, n) for all v, and the inequality
holds strictly for some v.
13 Although we can allow for additional auction covariates x ∈ X ⊂ RL, we suppress the depen-
dence on x for notational ease.
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If τ is separable, we extend Krasnokutskaya [2011] to achieve identification. If
it is nonseparable but discrete, we extend Hu, McAdams, and Shum [2013]. If
it is nonseparable and continuous, we extend D’Haultfœuille and Fe´vrier [2015].
Identification proceeds in two steps: First, identify the bid distribution conditional
on τ, G(·|τ, n), from the joint distribution of (b1, . . . , bn). Second, apply Corollary 1
to G(·|τ, n) to identify the primitives.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 6, θu, F0 (·|τ), F∗ (·|τ), and Fτ (·|n) for n = n1, n2
are identified from all the bids of auctions with n1 and n2 bidders if one of the following four
conditions is satisfied:
(1) Separable:
(a) Additive: F0 (v|τ) = F¯0 (v− τ), F∗ (v|τ) = F¯∗ (v− τ) for some distribu-
tion functions F¯0, F¯∗ and n1, n2 ≥ 2. In addition, v = 0.
(b) Multiplicative: F0 (v|τ) = F¯0 (v/τ), F∗ (v|τ) = F¯∗ (v/τ) for some distri-
bution functions F¯0, F¯∗ and n1, n2 ≥ 2. In addition, v = 1 and τ > 0.
(2) Non-separable:
(a) Discrete: The support of τ is discrete {1, 2, · · · , K} for n = n1, n2 ≥ 3. In
addition, Assumption 7 holds.
(b) Continuous: v (τ) is strictly increasing in τ and τ has the same support for
n = n1, n2 ≥ 3. In addition, Assumption 7 holds, τ = v (τ) and F0 (v|τ),
and F∗ (v|τ) are continuous with respect to (v, τ).
Proposition 3–1 requires both F0 and F∗ to be separable in τ to guarantee that the
bids are separable. This assumption is commonly used in the literature. Proposition
3–2 requires F∗(·|τ) to increase with τ in the sense of FOSD but puts no additional
restrictions on F0. We make this assumption because we only need the highest bid
to increase with τ, which is determined only by F∗ and the highest value, v (τ, n).
Assumption 7 and the fact that F0(·|τ) and F∗(·|τ) have common support also im-
ply that v (τ, n) is non-decreasing in τ. The restrictions on the values that τ takes
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are simply normalizations. The crucial assumption is that the support of τ is invari-
ant to n. This restriction allows us to match G(·|n, τ) across n for every τ. Therefore,
F0(·|τ) and F∗(·|τ) are identified at every value of τ.
3. ESTIMATION
In this section we develop a Bayesian estimation method that employs a flexi-
ble parametric specification based on the Bernstein polynomials. We observe the
bids, the number of bidders, and some auction characteristics from T auctions,
{b1,t, . . . , bnt,t, nt, xt}Tt=1, but neither the unobserved heterogeneity {τt}Tt=1 nor the
structural parameter θ (defined shortly). Let bt := (b1,t, . . . , bnt,t), y := (b1, . . . , bT),
n := (n1, . . . , nT), x := (x1, . . . , xT), and τ := (τ1, . . . , τT), and collect all the ob-
served variables in z := (y,n,x) and the latent variables in η := (τ , θ).
3.1. Statistical Model. In auction t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, bidders have values (vt,1, . . . , vt,nt)×
τt. Assume
vt,1, . . . , vt,nt |n,x,η i.i.d∼ F(·|xt, θV) (5)
with density f (·|xt, θV) that is strictly positive on its support [v(xt, θV), v(xt, θV)] ⊂
R++, where θV is the parameter of this distribution. Index the D−function by θD
where D(0|θD) = 0, D(1|θD) = 1, D′(·|θD) > 0, and D(γ|θD) ≤ γ for all γ ∈ [0, 1].
Then F∗(v|xt, θV , θD) := D(F(v|xt, θV)|θD) has a density f ∗(·|xt, θV , θD) supported
on [v(xt, θV), v(xt, θV)]. Assume that τ1, . . . , τT are conditionally independent and
distributed as
τt|n,x, θ ∼ Fτ(·|nt, xt, θτ), (6)
with density fτ(·|nt, xt, θτ), which is strictly positive on its support [τ(nt, xt, θτ), τ(nt, xt, θτ)] ⊆
R++.
If τt = 1, the equilibrium bidding strategy is
β(v|nt, xt, θV , θD, θu) := v−
∫ v
v(xt,θV)
[
F∗(α|xt, θV , θD)
F∗(v|xt, θV , θD)
] 1−nt
1−θu
dα,
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which is strictly increasing and differentiable. The bidding strategy in auction t
with τt 6= 1 is bi,t = τt × β(vi,t|nt, xt, θV , θD, θu); see Krasnokutskaya [2011]. Use a
change of variables to write the conditional density of bt as
g(bt|nt, xt, τt, θV , θD, θu) =
(
1
τt
)nt nt
∏
i=1
f
[
β−1
(
bi,t
τt
∣∣∣nt, xt, θV , θD, θu) ∣∣∣xt, θV]
β′
[
β−1
(
bi,t
τt
∣∣∣nt, xt, θV , θD, θu) ∣∣∣nt, xt, θV , θD, θu]
×1
{
v(xt, θV) ≤ bi,t
τt
≤ β
[
v(xt, θV)
∣∣∣nt, xt, θV , θD, θu]} . (7)
If we have a prior pi(θ) for θ, then the prior for all the latent variables has the
hierarchical structure
pi(η|n,x) := pi(θ)
T
∏
t=1
fτ(τt|nt, xt, θτ), (8)
and Bayes’ rule implies that the posterior is
pi(η|z) = pi(η|y,n,x) := c(z)−1pi(η|n,x)
T
∏
t=1
g(bt|nt, xt, τt, θV , θD, θu), (9)
where
c(z) :=
∫ {
pi(η|n,x)
T
∏
t=1
g(bt|nt, xt, τt, θV , θD, θu)
}
dη (10)
is the normalizing constant. c(z) is referred to as the marginal likelihood and is
useful in model selection (see subsection 3.2).
We end this subsection by showing that our estimator is posterior consistent,
which justifies our method in the frequentist sense. Define pi(θ|z) = ∫ pi(η|z)dτ
to be the posterior distribution of θ. Let Pθ be the probability measure induced by
the distribution of (bt, nt, xt) under θ, andP∞θ be its countably infinite product. The
following assumption requires that different θs lead to different model primitives.
Assumption 8. (1) If θ1V 6= θ2V , then ∀n, ∃Xn ⊂ Rdx , where dx ≥ 1 is the dimension
of x, such thatP (xt ∈ Xn|nt = n) > 0 and f
(·|x, θ1V) 6= f (·|x, θ2V)with positive
Lebesgue measure ∀x ∈ Xn. An analogous assumption holds for θτ.
(2) If θ1D 6= θ2D, then D(·|θ1D) 6= D(·|θ2D) with positive Lebesgue measure.
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Proposition 4. If Assumption 8 holds andP (nt = n) > 0 for at least two different n ≥ 2,
then for pi-a.s. θ, and ∀e > 0, ∫|θ−θ˜|>e pi (θ˜|z) dθ˜ → 0, P∞θ -a.s., as T → ∞.
Therefore, the posterior distribution of θ,pi(θ|z) converges weakly to the Dirac
measure with mass on the true parameter.
3.2. Posterior Analysis. We begin this subsection by introducing posterior mo-
ments. For a measurable function h(η), its posterior mean is
E[h(η)|z] :=
∫
h(η)pi(η|z)dη, (11)
and we can similarly obtain higher moments to explore various aspects of the
posterior of h(η). Because we are interested in the valuation density, we report
E[ f (v|x˜, θV)|z], as a density estimate, which is called the posterior predictive val-
uation density. Moreover, the posterior probability that h(η) ∈ A is equal to
E {1[h(θ) ∈ A]|z} . We represent the uncertainty around h(η) by the (1 − λ) ×
100% posterior credible interval, CIλ, such that E {1[h(η) ∈ CIλ]|z} = 1− λ. Fi-
nally, the seller who wishes to maximize the revenue from an auction with charac-
teristics (n˜, x˜, τ) chooses
ρB := arg max
ρ
E[Πn˜(ρ, x˜, τ; θ)|z], (12)
where Πn˜(ρ, x˜, τ; θ) is the (expected) revenue at reserve price ρ under θ.14 The so-
lution ρB is called the Bayes action.15
14 We refer to the seller’s payoff as revenue, which includes not only the payoff from selling the
good, but also the payoff from keeping the good if it goes unsold. We use Monte Carlo methods
to compute Πn(ρ, x, τ; θ) = τE[maxi∈{1,...,n}{β(vi|ρ, n, x, θ)1(τvi > ρ)} + v01(τ max{v1, . . . , vn} ≤
ρ)|x, θV ] where v0 denotes the seller’s valuation and the expectation is with respect to f (·|x, θV) and
β(v|ρ, n, x, θ) := v− ∫ vρ {D[F(α|x,θV )|θD ]D[F(v|x,θV )|θD ]} 1−n1−θu dα when ρ ≥ v(x, θV). That is, for each (τ, θ), we draw
(v˜(s)1 , . . . , v˜
(s)
n )
iid∼ f (·|x, θV) for s = 1, . . . , S independently with large S. For any given ρ ≥ v(x, θV),
then, S−1 ∑Ss=1 maxi∈{1,...,n}{β(v˜(s)i |ρ, n, x, θV , θD, θu)1(τv˜
(s)
i > ρ)} approximates Πn(ρ, x, τ; θ).
15 The Bayes action is coherent with respect to the axioms of the subjective expected utility theory
of Savage [1954] and Anscombe and Aumann [1963]. In general, the Bayes action that solves a deci-
sion problem, such as (12), is also optimal under the average risk principle, a widely used frequentist
decision criterion; see Berger [1985], Kim [2013], and Kim [2015].
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To allow for a flexible specification, we use Bernstein Polynomial Densities with
k components to parametrize the valuation density and the D-function.16 Then an
important question is how to pick k. We choose k through Bayes model selection.
Because a statistical model is distinguished by k, we use k to refer to the model. Let
pi(k) be the prior for model k ∈ K, and let ηk be the latent variable in model k with
prior pi(ηk|k) and posterior pi(ηk|z, k). Then, the posterior of the model k is
pi(k|z) ∝ pi(k)
∫
pi(ηk|z, k)dηk = pi(k)c(z|k), (13)
where c(z|k) is the marginal likelihood of k defined in (10). We consider the model
that maximizes (13) as the one that provides the best fit to the data and the prior
pi(k,ηk) = pi(k)pi(ηk|k).17 Given the structure of the problem, we can treat k as
an additional parameter in a larger model, which is distributed jointly with other
latent variables.18 In subsection 3.3 we develop a specification for D(·|θD), where
one element of θD (denoted by α) measures ambiguity aversion such that Pr(α ≤
0|z) = Pr(EU|z). Therefore, given a statistical model k, we can distinguish two
economic frameworks (EU vs. MEU).
3.3. Illustration. Here we illustrate how the Bayesian method works by applying
it to a bid sample generated from first-price auctions.
3.3.1. Data Generating Process. Figure 1 presents the model primitives. For the rest
of the paper we use superscript 0 to denote true parameters. Panel (a) shows the
true valuation density f 0, which is created by the mixture of the uniform density
on [0, 1] and the Beta density with parameters (2,4) with mixing weights 0.2 and
0.8, respectively. To accommodate unobserved heterogeneity, we shift the mixture
density by 0.01, such that when τ = 1 the range of the valuations is [0.01, 1.01].
16 We restrict that the number of components are the same for both valuation density and D-
function here to simplify the exposition. But our method allows them to be different.
17 The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), each
with different priors, provide rough approximations for this formal model comparison. The Bayesian
model comparison penalizes over-fitting because the prior becomes more diffused as the dimension
of the latent variables increases.
18 We explain the model selection procedure in detail in the Appendix of our working paper
version Aryal, Grundl, Kim, and Zhu [2017].
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Panel (b) plots the D-function (solid line), and panel (c) plots the CRRA utility
function with θ0u = 0.3 (solid line).
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[Figure 1 about here.]
For revenue analysis, we consider the auction with τ = 1, where the seller’s
true revenue as a function of the reserve price is denoted by Π0n(ρ) if the auction
has n bidders; see panel (d). Let ρ0n := arg maxρΠ0n(ρ) be the revenue maximiz-
ing reserve price (RMRP). We find that Π0n=2(ρ
0
n=2) is 3.26% larger than Π
0
n=2(0),
but Π0n=5(ρ
0
n=5) ≈ Π0n=5(0). For this reason, we only consider n = 2 for revenue
analysis and henceforth suppress the dependence of ρ0 and Π0 on n.
Now we define the distribution of τ. Let N(·|µ, σ2) be the CDF of N (µ, σ2) and
LN(·|µ, σ2) be the CDF of eZ where Z ∼ N (µ, σ2). In addition, let µτ(n, θτ) :=
(n− 2)γ1 and σ2τ(θτ) := exp(2γ2) with θτ := (γ1,γ2). Let the CDF of τ conditional
on n and θτ be the following truncated lognormal distribution:
Fτ(τ|n, θτ) = 1[τ > τ(n, θτ)] + cτ(n, θτ)LN[τ|µτ(n, θτ), στ(θτ)]1{τ ∈ [0.9, τ(n, θτ)]}, (14)
where
τ(n, θτ) := exp
(
N−1{1− N[τ|µτ(n, θτ), στ(θτ)]|µτ(n, θτ), στ(θτ)}
)
|τ=0.9
cτ(n, θτ) := LN[τ|µτ(n, θτ), στ(θτ)]|τ=0.9 − LN[τ(n, θτ)|µτ(n, θτ), στ(θτ)].
Therefore τ has the truncated lognormal distribution, with the lower bound nor-
malized to τ = 0.9 and the upper bound τ chosen to make the distribution of
log τ symmetric. We use θ0τ := (γ01,γ
0
2) = (0.02,−3). Panel (e) shows the densi-
ties of τ for n ∈ {2, 5}, suggesting that the unobserved heterogeneity could lower
the value (and therefore the bid) by 10% and could raise it by 11% when n = 2
(τn=2 = 1.1111) and 30% when n = 5 (τn=5 = 1.3039).
Auctions are homogeneous up to τ, and we draw 150 two-bidder auctions and
60 five-bidder auctions, i.e., (Tn=2, Tn=5) = (150, 60). To this end, we first draw
19 We use D0(γ) := 0.75γ · 1(γ ∈ [0, 0.75]) + (1.3688γ− 0.4635) · 1(γ ∈ [0.75, 0.85]) + (2γ− 1) ·
1(γ ∈ [0.85, 1]), which is piecewise linear so F∗ = D0(F0) is differentiable a.e..
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v1, . . . , v600
iid∼ f 0(·), compute 300 unscaled bids, (b˜1,t, b˜2,t)T2=150t=1 , from n = 2 bid-
der auctions by evaluating βn=2(·) at each of v1, . . . , v300 and 300 unscaled bids,
(b˜1,t, . . . , b˜5,t)
T5=60
t=1 , from n = 5 bidder auctions by βn=5(·) at each of v301, . . . , v600,
where
βn(v) = v−
∫ v
v
{
D0[F0(t)]
D0[F0(v)]
} n−1
1−θ0u
dt.
To evaluate βn(v) at each v, we first evaluate {b˜a = βn(v˜a)}1000a=1 , where (v˜0, v˜1, . . . , v˜1000)
is the vector of equidistant grid points partitioning the set of possible values into
1000 subintervals, i.e., because b˜0 = v˜0 = v, we need to evaluate βn(·) at v˜a with
a > 0. Then, we compute βn(v) at v /∈ {v˜a}1000a=0 using shape preserving piecewise
cubic Hermite interpolating polynomials (henceforth, the interpolation) with refer-
ence points (v˜a, b˜a)1000a=0 .
20 Finally, we obtain the bid data, bi,t := τtb˜i,t, where τt is an
independent draw from fτ(·|n, θ0τ) on panel (e) of Figure 1. Let bt := (b1,t, . . . , bnt,t)
and z1 := {bt}, where the subscript 1 in z1 refers to the first dataset. (We use many
datasets in section 4.)
3.3.2. Specification. For the density of τ, we use the correctly specified model, which
can be represented as a family of truncated lognormal densities { fτ(·|n, θτ)}. In or-
der to flexibly specify the valuation density and the D-function, we use Bernstein
polynomial densities (BPD) of the following form:
φ(x|ψ) =
k
∑
j=1
ψjbeta(x|j, k− j + 1), (15)
where k ∈ N \ {0, 1}, beta(x|a, b) is the Beta density with parameters a and b, and
ψ := (ψ1, . . . ,ψk−1) ∈ ∆k−1 := {ψ ∈ Rk−1+ : ∑k−1j=1 ψj ≤ 1,ψk := 1− ∑k−1j=1 ψj} is
the (k− 1)-dimensional unit simplex. Let Φ(x|ψ) be the CDF associated with (15),
which is the mixture of the k Beta CDFs; see Vitale [1975].21 In Figure 2 we plot
beta(·|j, k− j + 1), j = 1, . . . , k with different numbers of components k.
20 For the DGP here, the simulation results are robust with respect to the number of grid points
as long as it is sufficiently large, e.g., all the results in this paper would be essentially the same even
with 100 grid points.
21 BPD have been used in the empirical auction literature; see Aryal and Kim [2013]; Kim [2013];
Gentry, Li, and Lu [2015]; and Kong [2017]. For more on BPD see, for example, Petrone [1999a,b];
Leblanc [2012]; and Kakizawa [2004].
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[Figure 2 about here.]
BPD provides a flexible way to specify densities: when k increases, (15) forms a
dense subset in the space of continuous densities on the bounded interval; see
Lorentz [1986] and [Phillips, 2003, Ch. 7]. Moreover, most statistical packages cal-
culate Beta PDFs and CDFs, and because BPD is a mixture of Beta densities, it is
easy and quick to evaluate BPD and its integrals, which reduces the computational
burden.
We specify the valuation density f (v|θV) = φ(v|ψV)with θV := (ψV,1, . . . ,ψV,k−1)
and the D-function as
D(γ|θD) := γ− α · φ(γ|ψD) · 1(α ≥ 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(16)
with θD = (ψD,1, . . . ,ψD,k−1, α). To ensure that D(0|θD) = 0 and D(1|θD) = 1, we
restrict ψD,1 = ψD,k = 0, i.e., only use φj’s (Figure 2) that are equal to zero at the
boundaries. Note that D(γ|·) ≤ γ, with equality whenever α ≤ 0, i.e., EU.
This specification allows us to compute the posterior probability of alternative
models, {EU, MEU}, in a unified framework, thereby avoiding the need to run
each model separately to compute c(z1|EU) and c(z1|MEU). We construct a prior
pi(η) with η = (θ, {τt}) that puts a positive probability mass (≈ 26%) on the event
that α ≤ 0 (EU).22 Placing a positive prior mass on EU is important for model
comparison because the identity function has measure zero (in the set of all D−
functions). If we do not put a positive prior mass on the identity function, the
posterior probability on the EU model will always be zero.
3.3.3. Posterior Inference and Optimal Policy. Let {η(s)} be an ergodic sample from
the posterior. Using {η(s)}, we estimate the posterior predictive density f̂ (v) :=
E[ f (v|θV)|z1] and the 95% credible interval CI0.95(v) such that E {1 [ f (v|θV) ∈ CI0.95(v)] |z1} =
22 Under pi(η), α ∼ U [−0.05, 0.55], θu ∼ U [0, 0.9], and both ψV and ψD follow diffuse Dirichlet
distributions but the latter with D′(·|ψD) > 0. The positive mass on α ≤ 0 is estimated by simulation
draws generated from the prior. We use the independent Gaussian prior centered around the true
value with standard deviation of 0.1 for (γ1,γ2).
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0.95, for each v. (We suppress the dependence on z1, unless stated otherwise.) We
construct CI0.95(v) by the 2.5 and 97.5 posterior percentiles of f (v|θV).23
We do this exercise for three different cases: (i) correct case – there is ambigu-
ity and the econometrician allows for ambiguity; (ii) redundant case – there is no
ambiguity, but the econometrician still allows for ambiguity; and (iii) misspecified
case – there is ambiguity but the econometrician does not allow for ambiguity and
uses the EU model instead. In section 4 we explain these cases in detail.
To illustrate the performance of the posterior analysis, we mostly focus on the
correct case. Figure 3(a) shows { f̂ (·), CI0.95(·)} (dashed lines) along with f 0(·)
(solid line), for the correct case. In this section we set k = 6.
[Figure 3 about here.]
As can be seen, CI0.95(·) is narrow, which means the posterior inference on f (v|θV)
is precise.24 Moreover, the narrow credible band contains f 0(·) and f̂ (v) ≈ f 0(v)
over the entire support. Hence, the estimate is accurate.25 Furthermore, because we
know f 0(·), we can measure the accuracy of the estimator. The L2-distance between
the estimate and the true density is also small, d( f̂ , f 0) :=
{∫
[ f̂ (x)− f 0(x)]2dx
}1/2
=
0.056. Figure 3(b) shows D̂(·) := E[D(·|θD)|z1] and its point-wise 2.5 and 97.5 pos-
terior percentiles (dashed lines). The credible band contains D0(·) (solid line), and
the L2− distance is d(D̂, D0) = 0.015, which suggests that the estimate is accurate.
In addition, we find that the posterior probability placed on the EU model is small,
Pr(EU|z1) = E[1(α ≤ 0)|z1] = 9.07%, which is consistent with the DGP of the
correct case.
Next, we consider the problem of choosing an RMRP ρ. Figure 3(d) shows the
posterior predictive revenue Π̂(ρ) := E[Π(ρ,η)|z1] for n = 2 along with its 95%
posterior credible band (dashed lines). Recall that ρB = arg maxρ Π̂(ρ), which is
23 See Aryal, Grundl, Kim, and Zhu [2017] for the computational steps involved in this procedure.
24 An estimate is precise if there is little uncertainty around the estimate – i.e., if the posterior
(sampling) distribution is condensed from the Bayesian (frequentist) point of view. Here we use the
Bayesian perspective, and in section 4 we use the frequentist perspective.
25 An estimate is accurate if it is close to the true value. We can measure the accuracy only when
we know the DGP (here and in section 4), otherwise we cannot (section 5).
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the Bayes action for the RMRP. The figure shows that ρB = 0.21, at which the pos-
terior predicts the revenue Π̂(ρB) = 0.311 and the 2.5 and 97.5 posterior percentiles
of Π̂(ρB), forming a 95% posterior credible interval, are [0.282, 0.340]. See also the
first row of Table 1. This interval includes the true revenue, Π0(ρB) = 0.315, which
is close to Π0(ρ0) = 0.316 where ρ0 = arg maxρΠ0(ρ). We find that the revenue
loss from using ρB instead of ρ0 is 0.317%. Finally, panels (c), (e), and (f) show
the pairwise scatter diagrams of (θu,γ1,γ2), which provide information on the first
two posterior moments. The true parameter values (dashed lines) are well sup-
ported by the posterior distribution, and the posterior means approximate the true
parameters.
Table 1 shows the results for all three (correct, redundant, and misspecified)
cases. The results for the redundant case (second row) are similar to those of the
correct case. In contrast to these, the revenue loss for the misspecified case (third
row) is 2.6%, which is substantially larger than the previous two cases.
[Table 1 about here.]
3.4. Discussion. In this subsection, we explain some advantages of our direct Bayesian
method. First, the direct approach allows us to develop an empirical method that
is internally coherent with the underlying economic theory, thereby improving ef-
ficiency and producing reliable policy recommendations; see Kim [2015]. We di-
rectly impose theoretical shape restrictions such as D′(·) > 0 and D(γ) ≤ γ and
then equilibrium properties including G(b|n) ≥ G(b|n + 1) and monotonicity of
the bidding function automatically follow. Imposing such restrictions is difficult
with an indirect approach in the spirit of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] and
particularly critical to analysis with ambiguity because the denominator of the in-
verse bid function (4) is often close to zero, as it is a difference of densities, resulting
in spikes in estimated inverse bidding function.
Second, the Bayesian method offers a natural way to combine bids from different
n efficiently when there is rich variation in n. However, it is not obvious how to do
so with an indirect approach.
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Third, the Bayesian approach provides a decision theoretic framework that is
useful for the seller to choose a reserve price to maximize the expected revenue; see
Aryal and Kim [2013] and Kim [2013, 2015]. In addition, the statistical model for bid
data from first-price auctions is non-regular because the support of bids depends
on parameters of interest (the indicator in (7)). In this case, a Bayesian method
may be preferred over standard frequentist methods; see Hirano and Porter [2003]
and Chernozhukov and Hong [2004]. A Monte Carlo study shows our method
outperforms an indirect frequentist method; see the Appendix in Aryal, Grundl,
Kim, and Zhu [2017].
Lastly, in general, the Bayesian approach handles unobserved heterogeneity via
an MCMC algorithm with data augmentation which is more convenient than for
frequentist methods, and formal model comparison is easier under our direct Bayesian
method (subsections 3.2 and 3.3).
4. MONTE CARLO STUDY
We consider three different cases: (i) correct, (ii) redundant, and (iii) misspeci-
fied. For each case, we study the sampling distributions of the Bayesian predictive
estimates and the seller’s problem of choosing a reserve price.
4.1. Correct Case. We draw M = 1000 datasets {zm}Mm=1 independently from the
DGP shown in Figure 1.26 For each realization, we apply our method that was de-
scribed in subsection 3.3. This Monte Carlo study generates estimates { f̂m, D̂m, θ̂u,m, γ̂m}Mm=1,
the Bayes actions, and the corresponding true revenues {ρB,m,Π0(ρB,m)}Mm=1.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4(a) summarizes the sampling distribution of { f̂m}Mm=1 by their point-wise
mean and their 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles (the outer dashed lines). The point-wise
mean (the inner dashed line) closely approximates f 0 (the solid line) with a narrow
95% frequency band. As discussed in subsection 3.3.3, the sampling distribution
of the estimates here is different from the posterior distribution in subsection 3.3.
26 We also considered a different DGP where valuations are uniform random variables. The qual-
itative conclusions remain the same, and those results are available upon request.
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The latter quantifies the uncertainty regarding θ for a given data set z1, whereas
the former represents the variation of the Bayesian estimate (posterior mean) due
to the randomness of z.
The sampling distribution of {D̂m}Mm=1 is shown in Figure4 (b). Panels (c), (e),
and (f) present the pairwise scatter diagrams for the sampling distribution of the
posterior mean of (θu,γ1,γ2) with their respective MSEs. Figure 4(d) displays the
sampling distributions of {Π̂m}Mm=1. The average revenue loss of employing ρB in-
stead of ρ0 is 0.510%. Table 2 documents the mean integrated squared error (MISE)
of f̂ and the MISE of D̂ (the numbers in the table are scaled by a factor of 100).
[Table 2 about here.]
Finally, we consider larger samples: (i) (Tn=2, Tn=5) = (300, 120), i.e., 300 auc-
tions with two bidders and 120 auctions with five bidders, and hence a total of
1,200 bids; and (ii) (Tn=2, Tn=5) = (600, 240), and hence a total of 2,400 bids. For
each case, we repeat the Monte Carlo experiments with M = 1, 000 replications.
The estimates become more accurate and the revenue loss decreases as the sample
size increases; see the second and third rows in each case in Table 2.
4.2. Redundant Case. We generate datasets {zm}Mm=1 from the DGP shown in Fig-
ure 1 except that now we remove ambiguity by imposing D0(γ) = γ.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 summarizes the sampling distributions of the estimates. These estimates
are precise and accurate. D̂ is indistinguishable from the 45◦ line. Table 2 docu-
ments the mean integrated squared error (MISE) of f̂ and the MISE of D̂. Figure
5(b) shows the histogram of {θ̂u,m}Mm=1. The estimates for (γ1,γ2) are accurate,
while θu is underestimated. Moreover, ρB generates essentially maximal revenues.
As before, the estimates become more accurate and the revenue loss decreases as
the sample size increases.
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4.3. Misspecified Case. We generate datasets {zm}Mm=1 from the DGP shown in
Figure 1 with ambiguity-averse bidders. The DGP is the same as in subsection 4.1,
but during estimation we (incorrectly) impose D(γ) = γ and ignore ambiguity.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 6 summarizes the sampling distribution of the estimates. As can be seen,
the distribution of { f̂m}Mm=1 does not approximate f 0, and the CRRA coefficient is
overestimated. Table 2 documents that the MISE of f̂ is 2.04 times the MISE of f̂ for
the correct case, when the sample size is 600. Moreover, the MSE of θ̂u is 6.03 times
bigger than the MSE of θ̂u for the correct case. Lastly, using a misspecified model
leads to approximately 2% lower revenue.
4.4. Rich variation in n. Until now, we have considered auctions with two and five
bidders, i.e., N1 = {2, 5}. Here we consider two more cases: when we have data
from auctions with N2 = {2, 4, 5} bidders, and when we have data from auctions
with N3 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} bidders. For both N2 and N3, we also study all three cases
with 600 bids, 1,200 bids, and 2,400 bids with each n ∈ Nj bidder auction equally
sharing the bids.
[Table 3 about here.]
For example, if we observe 1,200 bids for N2, we observe 400 bids for each of n ∈
{2, 4, 5} bidder auctions; i.e., we observe 200 two-bidder auctions, 100 four-bidder
auctions, and 80 five-bidder auctions. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, we find similar
results with N2 and N3 as we do with N1. The correct and the redundant cases lead
to accurate estimates with essentially maximum revenues, while the misspecified
model results in far less accurate estimates with a revenue loss of about 2%.
[Table 4 about here.]
5. APPLICATION TO TIMBER AUCTIONS
5.1. Data. In this section, we study the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions in the
Pacific Northwest from December 1976 to December 1978. Prior to the National
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Forest Management Act of 1976, the Forest Service mainly relied on ascending auc-
tions, and first-price auctions accounted for only about 2% of all sales (Figure 7).
After 1976 the Forest Service adopted first-price sealed-bid auctions as the primary
selling mechanism. Between 1977 and 1978 the Forest Service gradually reverted
back to using ascending auctions because many bidders opposed the change. After
1978, fewer than 5% of the tracts were sold using sealed-bid auctions. We study the
two-year window from 1976 to 1978, when the sealed-bid auction format was the
main method of sale.27
[Figure 7 about here.]
We also estimate the model using data from the California region during the
same time window, where first-price auctions were common prior to 1976. These
results are presented in our working paper Aryal, Grundl, Kim, and Zhu [2017].
While we find that ambiguity aversion is important in the Pacific Northwest, we
estimate that the D−function is close to the 45 degree line in California.
We focus on the subsample of T = 165 scaled auctions reserved for small busi-
nesses, with a total of 960 bids, submitted by nt ∈ {2, . . . , 11} bidders, with an
average of 5.8 bidders in each auction. We exclude auctions with large bidders,
because our model assumes symmetric bidders.28 In terms of the observed auc-
tion covariates (xt) we use the appraisal value and the timber volume (measured in
board foot). In addition, we allow for unobserved auction heterogeneity (τt).
5.2. Specification. We specify the valuation distribution for τ = 1 as follows. Let
v(µ, σ2) and v(µ, σ2) be the 0.1 and 99.9 percentiles of LN(·|µ, σ2), respectively, and
27 In ascending auctions bidding one’s value is a dominant strategy, and bidders therefore have a
weaker incentive to learn the valuation distribution of their rivals than in first-price auctions. Even
if the bidders would try to learn the valuation distribution from ascending auctions, it is unclear
whether they could, because bid data from ascending auctions only partially identifies F0 without
imposing strong assumptions Haile and Tamer [2003]. The median number of first-price auctions that
a bidder has previously participated in before we observe the bidder in our sample is two. Grundl
and Zhu [2015] did not find a significant effect of experience on bids during the sample period, which
suggests that estimating a static model is a reasonable approximation.
28 Athey, Levin, and Seira [2011] find that loggers (small firms without manufacturing capacities)
have lower valuations than millers (large vertically integrated firms that own a timber mill).
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consider the truncated lognormal distribution
F˜(v|µ, σ2) := 1 [v(µ, σ2) ≤ v]+(LN(v|µ, σ2)− 0.001
0.998
)
1
[
v(µ, σ2) ≤ v < v(µ, σ2)] ,
whose density is denoted by f˜ (v|µ, σ2). We first specify the dependence of the
mean (µ) and the variance (σ2) on the observed covariates x as follows:
µV(x|γV) := γV,1 + γV,2 · log (appraisal value)+ γV,3 ·
(
volume
1, 000
)
, (17)
log σV(x|γS) := γS,1 + γS,2 · log (appraisal value)+ γS,3 ·
(
volume
1, 000
)
, (18)
where γV := (γV,1,γV,2,γV,3) and γS := (γS,1,γS,2,γS,3). Then, we define the valu-
ation distribution with τ = 1 to be
F(v|x, θV) = Φ
(
F˜[v|µV(x|γV), σ2V(x|γS)]
∣∣∣ψV) , (19)
where θV = (γV ,γS,ψV), and Φ(·) is the CDF associated with the BPD defined in
(15) with ψV ∈ ∆k−1. Note that the valuation density for τ = 1 is supported on the
compact interval [v(µ, σ2), v(µ, σ2)]. From the log density that corresponds to (19),
log f (v|x, θV) = log f˜ [v|µV(x|γV), σ2V(x|γS)] + log φ
(
F˜[v|µV(x|γV), σ2V(x|γS)]
∣∣∣ψV) ,
we see that (19) approximates the true distribution with the truncated lognormal
distribution first and improves the approximation with the BPD. For the distribu-
tion of unobserved heterogeneity, we use a truncated lognormal distribution. We
normalize the lower bound of τ to be τ := 0.9 and specify its mean as
µτ(n, x|γτ) =
(
γτ,1 · log (appraisal value)+ γτ,2 ·
(
volume
1, 000
)
+ γτ,3 · (n− 2)
)
1[n > 2]. (20)
Then, we choose the upper bound of τ in such a way that the distribution of log τ
is symmetric around its mode, i.e.,
τ(n, x, θτ) := exp
(
N−1
{
1− N [τ|µτ(n, x,γτ), σ2τ] |µτ(n, x,γτ), σ2τ}) ∣∣∣
τ=0.9
(21)
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where θτ = (γτ,1,γτ,2,γτ,3, στ). Note that because µτ(2, x|γτ) = 0, E[log(τ)|n =
2, x, θu] = 0 for all x and θu. Finally, we use (16) for the D−function with θD =
(ψD, α) and u(w) = w1−θu .
The latent variable is then given by η := (θ, τ ) with θ := (θV , θD, θu, θτ) ∈
R6+(k−1) × R1+(k−3) × R × R4, and τ ∈ RT=165. Thus, η = (θ, τ ) ∈ R2k+8+T.
To evaluate the integral we use the MH algorithm by partitioning η into J = 5+ T
blocks (η1,η2,η3,η4,η5, {η5+t}Tt=1) = [γV ,γS,ψV , (θD, θu), θτ, {τt}Tt=1].29
[Figure 8 about here.]
5.3. Posterior Analysis. We are interested in determining whether the data favors
the MEU or the EU model. Figure 8 shows the point-wise mean of the D-function’s
posterior distribution and its 95% credible band for k ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. As can be
seen, the D-function is far from the 45 degree line. The posterior moments of all
parameters are presented in Table 5. As can be seen in Table 5-II Column (F), the
posterior probability of the EU model is close to zero.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
Next, we explore the effect of ambiguity on the choice of the optimal reserve
price ρ for n = 2. For all exercises below, we fix the timber volume and the ap-
praisal value at their median values and assume that the valuation of the seller is
equal to the appraisal value. The results are shown in Table 6, where column (A)
is the Bayes action ρB that maximizes the posterior expected seller payoff, and (B)
and (C) summarize the posterior distribution of the seller payoff under the Bayes
action with the mean and its 95% credible interval, respectively. Columns (B) and
(D) show that the seller can always guarantee a sale, without sacrificing a lot of
revenue, by choosing a non-binding reserve price.
[Table 7 about here.]
[Table 8 about here.]
29 See the Appendix in Aryal, Grundl, Kim, and Zhu [2017] for details on the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm.
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[Table 9 about here.]
5.4. Counterfactuals. In the first counterfactual we ask, “What happens to bids if
the bidders know F0?” To answer this question, we eliminate ambiguity by setting
F∗ = F0. Recall that ambiguity aversion can lead to more or to less aggressive
bidding, so the sign of the effect on bids is a priori unclear. This counterfactual tells
us whether the seller has an incentive to reduce the ambiguity among bidders – for
example, by giving the bidders easy access to all bids in past auctions.
We find that ambiguity leads to aggressive bidding, and if the bidders knew F0,
the expected seller payoff would decrease (see Table 7 (B)). By comparing column
(D) in Tables 6 and 7 and expressing the difference as a percentage of column (D)
in Table 7, we can see that by revealing information, the seller would lose about
3 to 4.5%. If, instead, the seller eliminates ambiguity among bidders and chooses
an optimal reserve price (replace column D with column B), the seller would lose
about 2.5 to 3.5%. We also analyze the seller’s problem using the posterior of the
parameters conditional on EU, and the results (Table 8) are qualitatively the same.
In the second counterfactual we try to disentangle the effects of ambiguity aver-
sion and risk aversion on bids. We simulate bids (i) without either risk aversion or
ambiguity; (ii) with only ambiguity; and (iii) with only risk aversion, and we do
pair-wise comparisons to isolate the effect of risk aversion from ambiguity aver-
sion. The results are shown in Table 9. For instance, with k = 8, ambiguity aversion
raises bids by almost 2% and risk aversion by 7.6%, while their combination raises
the bids by 9.5%.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a framework for studying first-price auctions with ambiguity-
averse bidders. We focus on auctions with independent private values and sym-
metric, risk-averse bidders where the number of observed bidders can be corre-
lated with unobserved auction characteristics as long as it does not affect the model
primitives. For those auctions, we show that data on bids and the variation in the
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number of bidders can be used to nonparametrically identify the true valuation
distribution and the lower-envelope of the set of all distributions considered by the
bidders.
We propose a flexible Bayesian estimation method and apply it to the USFS tim-
ber auctions from the Pacific Northwest. Our estimates suggest that there is evi-
dence of ambiguity in this data. We find that ambiguity leads to aggressive bid-
ding and therefore the seller benefits from ambiguity among the bidders. We also
apply our method to timber auction data from California and find little evidence of
ambiguity. In contrast to the Pacific Northwest, first-price auctions were common
in California prior to the beginning of our sample period.
We conclude with a avenues for future research. Our analysis focuses on auc-
tions with symmetric bidders, but in many auctions bidders can be asymmetric. Ex-
tending the identification results to environments with asymmetric bidders is there-
fore an important avenue for future research. Another avenue for future research
is to consider richer models of decision making under ambiguity; see Machina and
Siniscalchi [2014] for descriptions of such models.
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APPENDIX
A-1. PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. By Assumptions 2(1) and 3, every F ∈ Γn has the same support
as F0, implying F∗(v(n)|n) = 0 and F∗(v(n)|n) = 1. Next, we show
C1(v2 − v1) ≤ F∗(v2|n)− F∗(v1|n) ≤ C2(v2 − v1), ∀v(n) ≤ v1 < v2 ≤ v(n) (22)
To see the first inequality, notice by the definition of infimum, ∀e > 0, ∃F ∈ Γn
such that F(v2|n) < F∗(v2|n) + e. Therefore, F∗(v2|n) − F∗(v1|n) > F(v2|n) −
F∗(v1|n)− e ≥ F(v2|n)− F(v1|n)− e ≥ C1(v2 − v1)− e, where the last inequality
follows from f ≥ C1 on [v(n), v(n)] and e > 0. Since e is arbitrarily small, the
first inequality in (22) holds. Similarly, we can show that F∗(v2|n) − F∗(v1|n) ≤
C2(v2 − v1). Then, (22) implies that F∗(·|n) is strictly increasing and continuous
on [v(n), v(n)]. Because F∗(·|n) is of bounded variation, it has a derivative f ∗(·|n)
almost everywhere. Since F∗(·|n) is continuous, f ∗(·|n) is a proper density. Finally,
C1 ≤ f ∗(·|n) ≤ C2 follows from (22). 
Proof of Proposition 1. We begin with the following intermediary step.
Lemma 2. Let G(·|n) be the joint distribution of (b1, b2, . . . , bn) conditional on n. There
is a symmetric IPV auction model with maxmin expected utility, i.e., (D(·), F(·)), that
rationalizes G(·|n) if and only if G(b1, . . . , bn|n) = ∏ni=1 G(bi|n), where G(·|n) is the
marginal distribution of bids and the function
ξ (b) = b +
1
n− 1
D (G (b|n))
D′ (G (b|n)) g (b|n)
is strictly increasing in b and F (v|n) = G (ξ−1 (v) |n).
Proof. The “only if” part is obvious. For the “if” part, we only need to show that
ξ−1 (v) is the bid function under D (F (v|n)). We only need to check that ξ−1 (v)
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satisfies the FOC of the bidding strategy. To see this, note by the definition of ξ,
v− ξ−1 (v) = 1
n− 1
D
(
G
(
ξ−1 (v) |n))
D′ (G (ξ−1 (v) |n)) f (v|n) / ∂∂vξ−1 (v)
=
1
n− 1
D (F (v|n)) ∂∂vξ−1 (v)
D′ (F (v|n)) f (v|n) ,
which is the FOC of the equilibrium bidding strategy. 
Let G (·|n) be a bid distribution generated by (D(·), F0(·|n)). Here D′ is strictly
positive, D (γ) ≤ γ and F0(·|n) is supported on a bounded interval. Without loss
of generality, suppose D′(·) ≥ e > 0. We now construct a new structure (D1, F1) 6=
(D, F0), which also rationalizes the data. To do so, first define
m (y) =

y− 0.5, if y ∈ [0, 1]
0, otherwise.
Now for any 0 ≤ δ < 2e, define a candidate D1− function:
M (γ, δ) =
∫ γ
0
(
D′ (y) + δm (y)
)
dy, γ ∈ [0, 1],
which satisfies Mγ(γ, δ) = ∂M(γ, ·)/∂γ = D′(γ) + δ(γ− 1/2) > 0 and M(γ, δ) ≤
γ. Now the inverse bid function under M is
β−1n (b, δ) = b +
M (G (b|n) , δ)
Mγ (G (b|n) , δ)
1
(n− 1) g (b|n) .
As δ→ 0,
∂β−1n (b, δ)
∂b
= 1+
1
(n− 1)
−M(G(b|n), δ)
(
Mγγ(G(b|n), δ)g(b|n)2 + Mγγ(G(b|n), δ)g′(b|n)
)
(n− 1)Mγ(G(b|n), δ)2g(b|n)2
→ ∂β
−1
n (b, 0)
∂b
,
uniformly in b, where β−1n (b, 0) is the inverse bid function under (D(·), F0(·|n)). Be-
cause ∂βn (v, 0) /∂v is bounded from above and below, so is ∂β−1n (b, 0) /∂b. There
is a constant c > 0 such that for any 0 < δ < c, ∂β
−1
n (b,δ)
∂b > 0. Choose any 0 < δ < c
and define D1(γ) ≡ M (γ, δ) 6= D(γ), and F1 (v|n) = G (βn (v, δ) |n) with βn (v, δ),
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as the inverse of β−1n (b, δ). Because βn (v, δ) is strictly increasing, F1 (v|n) is a valid
distribution function. By Lemma 2, (D1(·), F1(·|n)) also rationalizes G (b|n). 
Proof of Corollary 1. We exploit the fact that the slope of the bid function at the
lower bound of the support does not depend on F∗(·) but only on the utility func-
tion [Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2009]. Under CRRA utility, one can show that
β′n(v) = (n − 1)/(n − θu). Because β′n(v) = f0(v|n)/g(βn(v)|n) for n1 and n2,
β′n1 (v)
β′n2 (v)
= f0(v|n1)g(βn1 (v)|n1)
× g(βn2 (v)|n2)f0(v|n2) =
g(βn2 (v)|n2)
g(βn1 (v)|n1)
. Evaluating this equation at v = v
identifies θu, as
θu =
n2(n1 − 1)g(b2|n2)− n1(n2 − 1)g(b1|n1)
(n1 − 1)g(b2|n2)− (n2 − 1)g(b1|n1)
, (23)
where b1 and b2 are the smallest bid in auctions with respectively, n1, n2 bidders.
Once θu is identified, F0 and F∗ can be identified by following the same steps as in
the proof of Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Proposition 3–1a is a model in which v = v∗ + τ, where
v∗ is independent of τ and has distribution F¯0. A bidder with value v and CRRA
coefficient θu in an auction with n bidders and unobserved heterogeneity τ bids
β∗n (v∗, τ) = τ + v∗ −
∫ [ F¯∗ (ξ)
F¯∗ (v)
] n−1
1−θu
dξ = τ + β∗n (v∗, 0) .
The marginal bid distribution is a convolution of Fτ (·|n) and the distribution of
bids when τ = 0, i.e., β∗n (v∗, 0). Since we observe the joint bid distribution from
one auction, we can apply Kotlarski [1967]’s Lemma to identify Fτ (·|n) and the dis-
tribution of β∗n (v∗, 0), up to a location constant. The location constant is identified
by assumption that v = 0, which sets the lower bound of β∗n (v∗, 0) to be zero. We
then identify (θu, F0, F∗) by applying the arguments of Proposition 2 to the distri-
bution of β∗n (v∗, 0) with n ∈ {n1, n2}.
Proposition 3–1b is a model in which v = v∗ × τ, which is equivalent to log v =
log v∗ + log τ. Hence, the previous identification arguments apply verbatim with
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the multiplicative bidding strategy,
β∗n (v∗, τ) = τ ×
{
v∗ −
∫ [ F¯∗ (ξ)
F¯∗(v)
] n−1
1−θu
dξ
}
= τ × β∗n (v∗, 1) .
Following Krasnokutskaya [2011], then we identify the distributions of τ and β∗n (v∗, 1),
up to a scaling constant, which is normalized to v = 1. We then identify (θu, F0, F∗)
by applying the arguments of Proposition 2 to the distribution of β∗n (v∗, 1) with
n ∈ {n1, n2}.
For Proposition 3–2a, notice that βn (v(τ), τ) = v (τ) −
∫ v(τ)
v(τ) F
∗ (ξ|τ) n−11−θu dξ. If
τ1 > τ2 then Assumption 7 implies v (τ1) ≥ v (τ2) and v (τ1) ≥ v (τ2). Since
F∗ (ξ|τ1)
n−1
1−θu ≤ 1 and F∗ (ξ|τ1)
n−1
1−θu = 0 if ξ ≤ v (τ1),
βn (v, τ1) = v (τ1)−
∫ v(τ1)
v(τ1)
F∗ (ξ|τ1)
n−1
1−θu dξ ≥ v (τ2)−
∫ v(τ2)
v(τ2)
F∗ (ξ|τ1)
n−1
1−θu dξ
> v (τ2)−
∫ v(τ2)
v(τ2)
F∗ (ξ|τ2)
n−1
1−θu dξ,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 7. To see this, if v (τ1) > v (τ2)
or v (τ1) > v (τ2), then F∗ (s|τ1) < F∗ (s|τ2) for s = v (τ2) or s = v (τ2). Otherwise,
F∗ (s|τ1) < F∗ (s|τ2) for some s ∈ [v (τ2) , v (τ2)] = [v (τ1) , v (τ1)]. Therefore, the
rank condition in Hu, McAdams, and Shum [2013] is satisfied. Then for each n,
we can apply the eigenvalue decomposition technique to identify the set of distri-
butions in which each element corresponds to a bid distribution conditional on a
particular value of τ. We also obtain the probability that τ takes that value. Since
the highest bid is increasing in τ and the support of τ is normalized to {1, · · · , K},
one can sort the conditional bid distributions and corresponding probabilities that
τ takes a specific value according to the upper bound of the support of the bid dis-
tribution, thereby identify G (b|τ, n) and Fτ (·|n). Then from the previous result we
identify θu, F0 and F∗ from G (b|τ, n) with the same τ but different n.
For Proposition 3–2b, notice that by using the same argument as with the discrete
case, we can show that the highest bid βn (v(τ), τ) is strictly increasing in τ. Under
our assumption, moreover, the lowest bid, v (τ), is also strictly increasing in τ.
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Now, we need the conditional bid distribution given n and τ to be continuous in τ
to complete the proof.
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, G(b|τ, n) is continuous in τ for all b.
See below for the proof of this lemma. Then we apply [D’Haultfœuille and Fe´vrier,
2015, Theorem 2.1] to identify both G (b|τ, n) and Fτ (·|n), n = n1, n2 from G(b|n1)
and G(b|n2). Finally, following the arguments of Proposition 2, we identify (θu, F0, F∗)
from G (b|τ, n1) and G (b|τ, n2). 
Proof of Lemma 3. We fix b. If b < v (τ), G (b|τ, n) = 0, and if b > βn (v (τ) , τ),
G (b|τ, n) = 1. So, G (b|τ, n) is continuous in τ if b < v (τ) or b > βn (v (τ) , τ).
Now we claim that β−1n (b, τk) → β−1n (b, τ) for every sequence τk → τ such
that b ∈ [v (τk) , βn (v (τk) , τk)] for all sufficiently large ks. We prove this claim by
contradiction. Suppose there is such a sequence τk → τ but with β−1n (b, τk) 9
β−1n (b, τ). Because β−1n (b, τk) ∈ [v (τk) , v (τk)] for all sufficiently large ks, the se-
quence {τk} is bounded. Thus, it has a subsequence {τkl} such that β−1n
(
b, τkl
)
con-
verges to vˆ 6= β−1n (b, τ) where vˆ ∈ [v (τ) , βn (v (τ) , τ)] by the continuity of v (τ)
and βn (v (τ) , τ). This implies that b = βn
(
β−1n
(
b, τkl
)
, τkl
) → βn (vˆ, τ) 6= b be-
cause βn (v, τ) is strictly increasing in v on [v (τ) , v (τ)]. Hence, β−1n (b, τ) is contin-
uous in τ at b ∈ (v (τ) , βn (v (τ) , τ)) and, therefore, G (b|τ, n) = F0
(
β−1n (b, τ) |τ
)
is continuous in τ at the same b by continuity of F0.
Finally, we know G (b|τ, n) = 0 if b = v (τ). We have shown that G (b|τk, n) =
F0
(
β−1n (b, τk) |τk
) → F0 (v (τ, n) |τ) = G (b|τ, n) (= 0) for all τk ↑ τ such that
b ∈ [v (τk) , βn (v (τk) , τk)] for all sufficiently large ks. Moreover, if τk ↓ τ, then
G (b|τk, n) = 0 for all k because v(τ) is strictly increasing in τ. So, 0 = G (b|τk, n)→
G (b|τ, n) = 0. Hence, G (b|τ, n) is continuous at τ with b = v (τ). A similar argu-
ment shows that it is continuous at τ such that v (τ) = b. 
Proof of Proposition 4. First notice that that
pi (θ|z) =
∫
pi (η|z) dτ ∝ pi (θ)
T
∏
t=1
g (bt|nt, xt, θ) ,
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where g(·|·) is the joint density of bt given nt, xt and θ i.e.,
g (bt|nt, xt, θ) =
∫
g (bt|nt, xt, τt, θV , θD, θu) fτ (τt|nt, xt, θτ) dτt.
Hence, we only need to show that the posterior based on g (bt|nt, xt, θ) is consis-
tent. Because
Pθ (bt ≤ b, nt = n, xt = x) = Pθ (bt ≤ b|n, x)P (xt = x|nt = n)P (nt = n) ,
andP (xt = x|nt = n) andP (nt = n) do not contain unknown parameters, the pos-
terior based on g (bt|nt, xt, θ) is equivalent to the posterior based on the joint den-
sity of (bt, nt, xt). Next we show that if ∀θ1 6= θ2, there exist n with P (nt = n) > 0
and a set A ⊆ Rn+dx such thatPθ1 ((bt, xt) ∈ A, nt = n) 6= Pθ2 ((bt, xt) ∈ A, nt = n),
which allows us to apply Doob’s posterior consistency theorem [Doob, 1949] to
conclude the proof.
By Assumption, there exist ni > 1 such that P
(
nt = ni
)
> 0 for i = 1, 2. In
addition, for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists Xni such that P
(
xt ∈ Xni |nt = ni
)
>
0 and ∀x ∈ Xni ⊆ X, the set Cix =
{
(b, x) ∈ Rni+dx |g (b|x, ni, θ1) > g (b|x, ni, θ2)}
has positive Lebesgue measure. Otherwise, the conditional distributions of b given
almost every x are the same under θ1 and θ2, which contradicts assumption 8 and
the identification result.
Then without loss of generality, we can assume C1x has positive Lebesgue mea-
sure. Define A =
{
(b, x) ∈ Rn1+dx |b ∈ C1x, x ∈ Xn1
}
. One can easily show that
Pθ1
(
(bt, xt) ∈ A, nt = n1
)
> Pθ2
(
(bt, xt) ∈ A, nt = n1
)
. 
A-2. RELAXING COMMON SUPPORT ASSUMPTION
This section discusses what happens to identification if f0 and f ∗ have different
supports, because Assumption 3(3) does not hold. Consider, instead, the following
assumption:
Assumption 9. F∗ has a density f ∗, which is strictly positive on its support [v∗, v∗]. This
support contains the support of f0, i.e., [v, v] ⊂ [v∗, v∗].
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The second part of the assumption rules out [v, v] ⊃ [v∗, v∗], and therefore avoids
the possibility that bidders with value v ∈ [v, v]\[v∗, v∗] believes that f ∗(v) = 0.
Under Assumption 9, the bidding strategy is characterized by the first-order condi-
tion in equation (1) with the boundary condition βn(v∗) = v∗. Therefore, a bidder
with the lowest value can bid less than his value if v∗ < v.
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2(2), 4, 5 and 9, F0(·) and (F∗(v)/F∗(v)) 11−θu are
identified on [v, v]. If, in addition, Assumption 2(1) holds, θu and the value of F∗(v)/F∗(v)
on [v, v] are identified.
Proof. First notice that the inverse bid function (4) remains valid and therefore F0 is
identified. Integrate the first-order condition as before to obtain ∀v ∈ [v, v]
[
F∗ (v)
F∗ (v)
] 1
1−θu
= exp
(
−
∫ v
v
f0 (t)
(t− βn1(t)) g (βn1 (t)) (n1 − 1)
dt
)
. (24)
Therefore, the first part of this corollary follows. In addition, if Assumption 2(1)
holds, it must be that v∗ = v. According to Corollary 1, θu is identified. Moreover,
F∗(v)/F∗(v) is identified on [v, v] by (24). 
This corollary shows that F∗(v)
1
1−θu is in general identified on [v, v] up to a con-
stant. This identification result is sufficient to evaluate the seller’s revenue under a
reserve price higher than v because the bidding strategy depends on (F∗(v)/F∗(v))
1
1−θu .
With the additional assumption, moreover, we separately identify the effect of risk
aversion and the effect of ambiguity aversion.
A-3. BIASED BELIEF
In this section we compare the MEU model of first-price auctions and a biased be-
lief model with a single prior distribution, which is possibly different from the true
valuation distribution. First, we show in general they are observationally equiv-
alent. Then we impose all the assumptions we use throughout the paper on the
MEU model, which allows us to distinguish these two models. We argue that sim-
ilar restrictions in the biased belief model are less plausible.
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We begin by introducing a model with a biased belief. Valuations are distributed
as v iid∼ H0(·|n), but the bidders share the common prior that the valuations are
distributed as v iid∼ H∗(·|n). We say that the bidders’ belief is biased if H∗(·|n) 6=
H0(·|n). Let h0(·|n) and h∗(·|n) be the corresponding densities that are positive on
their entire supports [vnh0 , v
n
h0 ] and [v
n
h∗ , v
n
h∗ ], respectively.
First, consider both models under weak restrictions. For the MEU model we only
impose Assumption 1 and Assumption 2(2), which allows us to use the MEU model
in a strategic environment. In addition, we assume that F∗ is a distribution func-
tion. We impose no additional restrictions on the biased belief model. It is then easy
to see that both models are observationally equivalent: Suppose we observe data
that was generated by an MEU model with the primitives Γn with lower envelope
F∗(·|n) and F0(·|n). This data can be rationalized by a model with biased beliefs by
setting H0(·|n) = F0(·|n) and H∗(·|n) = F∗(·|n) for all n. Similarly, if the data is
generated by a model with biased beliefs with the primitives H0(·|n) and H∗(·|n)
then this data can be rationalized by the MEU model by setting F0(·|n) = H0(·|n)
and F∗(·|n) = H∗(·|n) for all n.
Next, we impose some additional restrictions on both models. For the MEU
model we impose Assumption 4 but not Assumptions 2(1) and 3. For the biased
belief model we assume that H0(·|n) and H∗(·|n) do not depend on n, which is
analogous to Assumption 4. Imposing these restrictions on both models does not
affect the argument in the previous paragraph. It can be shown that both models
are observationally equivalent in the same manner, even if there is variation in n.
Next, we impose additional restrictions. For the MEU model we impose As-
sumptions 2(1) and 3. Hence, we now consider the MEU model under the same
restrictions as in the rest of the paper. Assumptions 2(1) and 3 imply that (1) F∗
first order stochastically dominates F0, and that (2) the supports of f ∗ and f0 are the
same. Are similar restrictions for the biased belief model plausible? The restriction
that H∗ first-order stochastically dominates H0 would rule out overly optimistic
beliefs. In the MEU model this restriction follows from the assumption that F0 ∈ Γ,
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which is a plausible assumption. In a model of biased beliefs, however, there is
no particular reason to assume that beliefs are pessimistic. The restriction that the
supports of all distributions in Γ, and thereby the supports of f ∗ and f0 can be
motivated in the MEU model.30 In the biased belief model it is natural to assume
that supp (h0) ⊆ supp (h∗) to rule out the possibility that the bidders draw valu-
ations that are impossible under their belief, but supp (h0) = supp (h∗) cannot be
motivated in a similar fashion as in the MEU model.
Hence, we are left with a different set of plausible restrictions for both models.
The restrictions for the MEU model are: (1) F∗ first order stochastically dominates
F0, and (2) the supports of f ∗ and f0 are the same. The only restriction for the biased
belief model is that supp (h0) ⊆ supp (h∗). As the restrictions for the MEU model
are stronger, the two models are no longer observationally equivalent. Next, we
describe two scenarios in which we could reject the MEU model in favor of the
biased belief model.
First, consider a case in which vh∗ < vh0 . In this case the bidder with valuation
vh0 would shade her bid. Therefore the support of the bid distribution would in-
crease in n for the biased belief model. In contrast the MEU model predicts that the
support of the bid distribution does not vary with n.
Next, suppose that the lower bound of the bid distribution does not vary with n.
Grundl and Zhu [2013] show that the bid function in the biased belief model can be
expressed in terms of H∗(·|v < vnh0) and that this “conditional belief distribution”
and H0 are identified on [vh0 , vh0 ] using the same identification argument as in this
paper. If we apply this identification result and find that the recovered H∗ (·|v ≤ v)
does not first-order stochastically dominate H0 on [vh0 , vh0 ], then H
∗ does not first-
order stochastically dominate H0, which is not consistent with the MEU model.
30 The argument for this restriction is as follows. The bidders know that F0 ∈ Γ and consider all
distributions in Γ to be plausible candidates for F0. To rule out the possibility that a bidder draws
a valuation that is impossible under some distribution in Γ we require that supp ( f0) ⊆ supp ( f )
for all F ∈ Γ. Hence, any plausible candidate for F0, say F′0, should also satisfy the property that
supp
(
f
′
0
)
⊆ supp ( f ) for all F ∈ Γ. As all distributions in Γ are plausible candidates for F0 all
distributions in Γ satisfy this property. Hence, all distributions in Γ have densities with the same
support.
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FIGURE 1. Data Generating Process and Revenue Functions
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Panel (a) shows the valuation density, and panel (b) shows the D− function (solid
line) and the 45◦ line. Panel (c) shows the CRRA utility function (θu = 0.3) with the
45◦ line. Panel (d) shows the seller’s expected revenue for n = 2. Panel (e) shows
the density functions of unobserved heterogeneity τ for n ∈ {2, 5}.
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FIGURE 2. Basis Functions of the Bernstein Polynomial Density
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Panels (a), (b), and (c) show the basis functions for the BPD with k ∈ {3, 4, 6}, respectively.
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FIGURE 3. Posterior of Correct Case
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Panel (a) shows the posterior of the valuation density by its point-wise mean and
a 95% credible band. Panel (b) is the posterior of the D-function. Panel (c) sum-
marizes the posterior of the D-function. Panels (d) and (e) show the posterior of
revenue functions for n = 2 and n = 5 cases. On panels (a), (c), (d), and (e), the
true quantities are the solid line. (Panel (c) shows the identity.)
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FIGURE 4. Monte Carlo Study for Correct Model
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Panel (a) shows the sampling distribution of the estimated valuation densities by
its point-wise mean and a 95% frequency band. Panel (b) is the sampling distribu-
tion of the D-function. Panels (c), (e), and (f) present the pairwise scatter diagrams
for the sampling distribution of the posterior mean of (θu,γ1,γ2) with their MSEs,
respectively. Panel (d) is the sampling distributions of {Π̂m}Mm=1.
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FIGURE 5. Monte Carlo Study for Redundant Model
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Panel (a) and (b) show the sampling distribution of the estimated valuation densi-
ties and D-function by their point-wise mean and a 95% frequency band, respec-
tively. Panel (b) is the histogram of the CRRA estimates. Panels (c), (e), and (f)
present the pairwise scatter diagrams for the sampling distribution of the poste-
rior mean of (θu,γ1,γ2) with their MSEs, respectively. Panel (d) is the sampling
distributions of {Π̂m}Mm=1.
Figures
FIGURE 6. Monte Carlo Study for Misspecified Model
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Panel (a) and (b) show the sampling distribution of the estimated valuation densi-
ties and D-function by their point-wise mean and a 95% frequency band, respec-
tively. Panel (b) is the histogram of the CRRA estimates. Panels (c), (e), and (f)
present the pairwise scatter diagrams for the sampling distribution of the poste-
rior mean of (θu,γ1,γ2) with their MSEs, respectively. Panel (d) is the sampling
distributions of {Π̂m}Mm=1.
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FIGURE 7. Fraction of First-Price Auctions
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from 1973 to 1979.
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FIGURE 8. Posterior Distributions of D functions
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Each panel shows the posterior probability of the EU model, i.e., α ≤ 0, and sum-
marizes the posterior distribution of the D function by its point-wise posterior
mean and a 95% posterior credible band for each k ∈ {4, . . . , 8}, where ψD ∈ ∆k−1.
Tables
TABLE 1. Posterior Analysis for Seller Revenue, n = 2
Bayes’ Predictive 95 % Credible True Rev. at Rev. Loss (%)
Action Revenue Interval for B. Action, ρB wrt Maximum
ρB Π̂(ρB) Revenue Π0(ρB) Revenue
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Correct 0.21 0.311 [0.282,0.340] 0.315 0.317%
Redundant 0.24 0.293 [0.265,0.320] 0.316 0.026%
Misspecified 0.10 0.310 [0.283,0.337] 0.308 2.607%
Note: Column (A) shows the Bayes action, and columns (B) and (C) summarize
the posterior distribution of the revenue at the Bayes action by the mean and a
95% credible interval. Column (D) shows the true revenue at the Bayes action and
column (E) the revenue loss of using the Bayes action relative to the true maximum
revenue. That is, (E) = [Π0(ρ0)−Π0(ρB)]÷Π0(ρB)× 100%.
Tables
TABLE 2. Monte Carlo Study, N = {2, 5}
Total # MISE( f̂ ) MISE(D̂) MSE(θ̂u) Rev. Loss (%)
Cases of bids (A) (B) (C) (D)
Correct 600 0.0112 0.0016 0.0093 0.5096
1200 0.0070 0.0007 0.0080 0.4116
2400 0.0046 0.0005 0.0055 0.2484
Redundant 600 0.0077 0.0003 0.0172 0.3561
1200 0.0041 0.0003 0.0108 0.2304
2400 0.0022 0.0003 0.0063 0.1893
Misspecified 600 0.0229 0.0128 0.0561 1.9935
1200 0.0236 0.0128 0.0677 2.4922
2400 0.0252 0.0128 0.0720 2.7161
Note: Columns (A), (B), and (C) document the MISEs of the estimates of the valua-
tion density, the D- function and θu, respectively. Column (D) provides the revenue
loss of the Bayes auction relative to the true maximum revenue. Each row corre-
sponds to different sample sizes.
Tables
TABLE 3. Monte Carlo Study, N2 = {2, 4, 5}
Total N. MISE( f̂ ) MISE(D̂) MSE(θ̂u) Rev. Loss (%)
Cases of bids (A) (B) (C) (D)
Correct 600 0.0111 0.0019 0.0106 0.5899
1200 0.0068 0.0011 0.0083 0.4546
2400 0.0046 0.0005 0.0056 0.2746
Redundant 600 0.0070 0.0003 0.0173 0.3359
1200 0.0039 0.0003 0.0118 0.2342
2400 0.0020 0.0004 0.0070 0.1764
Misspecified 600 0.0214 0.0128 0.0543 1.9073
1200 0.0219 0.0128 0.0595 2.2208
2400 0.0228 0.0128 0.0700 2.6247
Note: Columns (A), (B), and (C) document the MISEs of the estimates of the valua-
tion density, the D-function, and θu, respectively. Column (D) provides the revenue
loss of the Bayes action relative to the true maximum revenue.
Tables
TABLE 4. Monte Carlo Study, N3 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
Total N. MISE( f̂ ) MISE(D̂) MSE(θ̂u) Rev. Loss (%)
Cases of bids (A) (B) (C) (D)
Correct 600 0.0113 0.0023 0.0110 0.6010
1200 0.0070 0.0013 0.0098 0.4981
2400 0.0044 0.0006 0.0066 0.3085
Redundant 600 0.0070 0.0003 0.0190 0.3560
1200 0.0037 0.0003 0.0127 0.2380
2400 0.0020 0.0004 0.0080 0.1842
Misspecified 600 0.0205 0.0128 0.0522 1.7979
1200 0.0191 0.0128 0.0637 2.2946
2400 0.0202 0.0128 0.0705 2.6349
Note: Columns (A), (B), and (C) document the MISEs of the estimates of the valua-
tion density, the D-function, and θu, respectively. Column (D) provides the revenue
loss of the Bayes action relative to the true maximum revenue.
Tables
TABLE 5. Posterior Moments of Parameters
(I)
µV (x) : Log of Volume log [σV (x)] : Log of Volume
constant App. Value ÷1,000 constant App. Value ÷1,000
γV,1 γV,2 γV,3 γS,1 γS,2 γS,3
k (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
4 2.070 (0.132) 0.606 (0.029) 0.001 (0.004) 3.656 (0.096) -1.549 (0.027) -0.007 (0.010)
5 2.068 (0.133) 0.607 (0.029) 0.001 (0.004) 3.658 (0.096) -1.550 (0.027) -0.006 (0.010)
6 2.115 (0.140) 0.601 (0.030) 0.000 (0.004) 3.655 (0.096) -1.551 (0.028) -0.005 (0.010)
7 2.157 (0.139) 0.594 (0.029) -0.001 (0.005) 3.656 (0.096) -1.549 (0.028) -0.005 (0.010)
8 2.167 (0.145) 0.593 (0.031) -0.000 (0.004) 3.660 (0.096) -1.548 (0.028) -0.005 (0.010)
(II)
Log of Volume #. bidders Variance of Risk Aversion Posterior
App. Value ÷1,000 (n− 2) Unobs. Hetero. CRRA Prob. of EU
γτ,1 γτ,2 γτ,3 σ
2
τ θu Pr(α ≤ 0|z)
k (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
4 0.011 (0.006) 0.007 (0.004) 0.015 (0.004) 0.012 (0.002) 0.757 (0.118) 0.063
5 0.011 (0.007) 0.006 (0.004) 0.016 (0.004) 0.012 (0.002) 0.740 (0.128) 0.041
6 0.009 (0.007) 0.007 (0.004) 0.014 (0.005) 0.011 (0.002) 0.655 (0.181) 0.009
7 0.009 (0.007) 0.008 (0.005) 0.014 (0.005) 0.011 (0.002) 0.611 (0.207) 0.014
8 0.009 (0.007) 0.007 (0.004) 0.013 (0.005) 0.011 (0.002) 0.585 (0.214) 0.005
Note: Table (I) is the posterior mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of
the parameters in equations (17) and (18), and Table (II) columns (A)-(D) for the
parameters in equation (20). Table (II), columns (E) and (F) are the posterior means
and standard deviations of the CRRA coefficient and the probability of EU, respec-
tively.
Tables
TABLE 6. Policy Analysis with MEU
Bayes’ Predictive 95 % Credible Predictive Predictive
Action Seller Payoff Interval Seller Payoff Probability (%)
ρB Π̂(ρB) at ρB at ρ = 0, Π̂(0) of Sale
k (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
4 95.547 129.954 [116.013,145.188] 129.941 0.987
5 96.855 130.002 [115.584,145.665] 129.977 0.983
6 102.417 131.252 [115.978,146.909] 131.089 0.967
7 103.399 130.851 [115.959,146.887] 130.608 0.964
8 104.380 130.733 [115.838,146.747] 130.444 0.962
Note: Here, n = 2 and the seller’s value is equal to the observed appraisal value.
Column (A) shows the Bayes’ action ρB; (B) and (C) summarize the posterior dis-
tribution of the seller payoff at ρB with the mean and a 95% credible interval; (D)
shows the seller payoff at ρ = 0; and (E) shows the probability that the highest bid
is larger than ρB.
Tables
TABLE 7. Counterfactual: No Ambiguity (Information Revelation)
Bayes’ Predictive 95 % Credible Predictive Predictive
Action Seller Payoff Interval Seller Payoff Probability (%)
ρB Π̂(ρB) at ρB at ρ = 0, Π̂(0) of Sale
k (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
4 96.543 126.686 [112.701,141.986] 126.664 0.984
5 97.363 126.405 [112.236,141.906] 126.374 0.982
6 102.286 126.218 [112.427,141.623] 126.127 0.968
7 103.926 125.923 [112.172,141.354] 125.770 0.962
8 105.567 126.135 [112.975,141.340] 125.922 0.957
Note: The bidders face no ambiguity, so the D−function is the identity function.
Like in Table 6, n = 2 and the seller’s value is equal to the observed appraisal
value. Column (A) shows the Bayes action ρB; (B) and (C) summarize the posterior
distribution of the seller payoff at ρB with the mean and a 95% credible interval;
(D) shows the true seller payoff at ρ = 0; and (E) shows the probability that the
highest bid is larger than ρB.
Tables
TABLE 8. Using the Conditional Posterior Pr(θ|EU, z);
Bayes’ Predictive 95 % Credible Predictive Predictive
Action Seller Payoff Interval Seller Payoff Probability (%)
ρB Π̂(ρB) at ρB at ρ = 0, Π̂(0) of Sale
k (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
4 96.528 127.650 [112.892,143.281] 127.630 0.984
5 99.146 126.326 [111.354,142.920] 126.274 0.974
6 106.670 121.917 [109.100,135.368] 121.558 0.924
7 113.541 121.063 [109.262,135.710] 119.733 0.866
8 112.886 118.636 [107.796,130.729] 117.305 0.846
Note: This table ignores ambiguity, so the D−function is the identity function.
Like in Table 6, n = 2 and the seller’s value is equal to the observed appraisal
value. Column (A) shows the Bayes action ρB; (B) and (C) summarize the posterior
distribution of the seller payoff at ρB with the mean and a 95% credible interval;
(D) shows the true seller payoff at ρ = 0; and (E) shows the probability that the
highest bid is larger than ρB.
Tables
TABLE 9. Effect of Ambiguity and Risk Aversion on Bidding
k (A) Both (B) CRRA (C) Ambiguity (D) (A) vs (B)
4 12.500 (5.667) 10.599 (4.360) 3.126 (3.479) 1.693 (2.184)
5 12.032 (6.046) 10.154 (4.328) 2.844 (3.870) 1.667 (2.502)
6 10.704 (7.264) 8.669 (4.257) 2.479 (5.658) 1.815 (4.092)
7 9.907 (7.212) 7.966 (4.346) 2.146 (5.364) 1.747 (4.154)
8 9.463 (7.026) 7.644 (4.292) 1.961 (4.892) 1.638 (3.901)
Note: Here k denotes the number of components in the BPD. Column (A), (B), and
(C) represent percentage increase in bids due to both ambiguity and risk aversion,
only due to risk aversion, and only due to ambiguity, respectively, all with respect
to bids without either ambiguity or risk aversion. Column (D) shows the percent-
age increase in bids due to ambiguity relative to the bid under risk aversion. Each
entry denotes the posterior mean of the percentage increase in bids. Posterior stan-
dard deviations are shown in parentheses.
